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Abstract
Since the beginning of the decade, numerous economic and monetary unification projects have
aroused a lot of interest. The reinforcement of economic and monetary integration, especially
in Europe, has set a trend for the creation of a monetary union in many others regions of the
world. Since then, the debate has moved towards the study of the parameters that justify the
creation of a single currency.
However, another current of thought emphasized the fragility of the traditional theory and
considered the criteria as incomplete, since this theory insists solely on a few elements con-
cerning the adjustment process under various exchange regimes (Bogdan 2004).
Also, many monetary unions have existed and lasted without meeting this theory’s criteria.
Other economists recommend studying the history of these monetary unions so as to define
the necessary conditions for the success of a monetary integration (Sharp 2005, Jonung 2002).
Within Maghreb, the completion of the regional integration process, initiated in 1989 by the cre-
ation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the establishment of the Maghreb monetary
union would have a positive impact on economic growth, good governance and political stability.
In this paper, we showed that the Maghreb Countries can not constitute a monetary block that
satisfies the criteria of optimality.
Moreover, the study of historical experiences also allowed us to verify that the MCs have to
strengthen their political coordination and improve their budgetary and financial situations to
establish a lasting monetary union.
Finally, with the aim of a Maghreb monetary unification, we conclude with the idea that these
countries have to make more efforts to gather economico-institutional conditions essential to
the institution of one of the two preliminary proposed monetary systems, namely a pure float
with inflation targeting or a currency board.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the decade, numerous economic and monetary uni-
fication projects have aroused a lot of interest. The reinforcement of economic
and monetary integration, especially in Europe, has set a trend for the creation
of a monetary union in many others regions of the world. Since then, the de-
bate has moved towards the study of the parameters that justify the creation of
a single currency. Many economists have tried to define the criteria that delin-
eate an optimal currency area (OCA), notably factors mobility (Mundell 1961),
openness degree (McKinnon 1963) and product diversification (Kenen 1969).
However, another current of thought has emphasized the fragility of the
traditional theory and has considered the criteria as incomplete, since this
theory insists solely on a few elements concerning the adjustment process
under various exchange regimes (Bogdan 2004). Moreover, Frankel and Rose
(1996, 1997, 1998), who are considered as the founders of the theory of endo-
geneity, have showed that, even if the criteria of optimum currency area are
not respected “ex ante”, they will surely be verified “ex post”, in particular
due to the intensification of trade after the creation of the single currency,
and consequently to the increase of business cycle correlations.
This debate is far from over because, since then, there has been a lack of
unanimity on these issues (Hallet and Piscitelli 2001).
Besides, many monetary unions have existed and lasted without meeting
this theory’s criteria. Other economists recommend studying the history of
these monetary unions so as to define the necessary conditions for the suc-
cess of a monetary integration (Sharp 2005, Jonung 2002).
In Maghreb – an area that groups together Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mau-
ritania and Tunisia – the completion of the regional integration process (initi-
ated in 1989 with the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the es-
tablishment of the Maghreb monetary union), would have a positive impact
on economic growth, good governance and political stability.
Indeed, the setting up of a monetary zone among Maghreb Countries
(MC) would represent an important symbol of unity and a powerful engine
to help these countries accelerate their political unifications and negotiations.2
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brought to this paper. Our thanks also go to Professors Hamadi Fehri (IHEC Tunis) and Raja
Amrani (CEREC and University Mohamed V Agdal) who have accepted to report on this article
as part of the third international colloquium «Nouvelle Politique de Voisinage NPV» organised
on 1-2 June 2007 in Hammamet-Tunisia.The view expressed in this paper are those of the au-
thors and do not necessarily represent those of the LEO.
2 In the case of Europe, Pollin (2000), Eichengreen (2002) and Issing (2004) believe that mon-
etary integration is only a springboard towards political integration.
The establishment of a single currency would also reduce transaction
costs between the countries of the region, facilitate intraregional trade, im-
prove transparency and eliminate all kinds of speculation on the relative val-
ue of each currency in the zone.
Moreover, for these countries, to be part of a monetary zone would repre-
sent a credible commitment towards macroeconomic stability. A monetary
unification would in fact induce institutional change, limiting surprising mon-
etary and fiscal impulses. Such stability would cancel the effects of a discre-
tionary monetary policy, stabilise agents’ anticipations, and therefore, limit in-
flationary effects.
The resulting price and interest rate stability would limit financial market
segmentation and strengthen capital market integration (De Grauwe and
Mongelli 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I attempts to check
if Maghreb3 meets the criteria for an optimum currency area. In Section II we
try to learn some lessons for MCs on the basis of the history of some mone-
tary unions. Finally, Section III deals with the advantages, drawbacks and
conditions of monetary arrangements likely to take place in MCs.
1. CONCEPT OF OCA: THE TEACHINGS OF THEORY
The issue of an OCA rests on the capacity of this area to face an asymmet-
ric shock without turning to the instrument of exchange rate as an adjust-
ment variable. The different criteria, allowing the members of this zone to
form a monetary space marked either by the existence of a single currency or
a structure of set and irrevocable parity, have to be determined. From then
on, the question of symmetric/asymmetric shock takes centre place in the
debate on OCA.4
The literature insists on two opposite approaches: the traditional ap-
proach developed during the 60’s and 70’s and the new approach initiated in
the early 1980s.
1.1. The traditional approach
Many of the criteria of OCA were defined during the 60’s. Mundell
(1961), Mac Kinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) were the main contributors to
define these criteria.
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3 In this section, we focus essentially on Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
4 For a Survey, see Beine (1998).
Factor’s mobility
In the definition of the borders of an OCA, two factors were taken into ac-
count: the mobility of labour on the one hand (Mundell 1961) and the mobil-
ity of capital on the other hand (Ingram 1962-1973).
Labour mobility: Mundell’s theory (1961) raises the question of the exis-
tence of economic criteria according to which, various regions of the world
can decide to adopt a single currency. According to him, two or several re-
gions have an interest in constituting a single monetary space if there is a
large mobility of factors (labour in particular) among them.
He stipulates that this mobility cancels the effects of an exogenous asym-
metric shock that shifts the demand from a country (or a region) to another.
However, in the absence of sufficient mobility of production factors, the
balance between countries won’t work automatically unless they opt for ex-
change rate flexibility.
Indeed, let’s consider a monetary union made up of two countries (A and
B) and suppose that full employment and the equilibrium of the balance of
payments are reached under the hypothesis of sticky prices and wages. If an
asymmetric shock causes a move of demand from A to B, the production of
A will decline, followed by an increase in unemployment and current deficit.
In B instead, the increase of the demand will cause a rise in production and
inflation on the one hand, and an improvement in the current balance on the
other hand.
If labour force is mobile between A and B, the imbalance on the labour
market and the problem of the balance of payment is automatically resolved.
The unemployed of A are forced to seek a job in B. The rise of demand in the
latter will translate into a reduction of exports and an increase of imports
from A.
Furthermore, Mundell maintains that such a demand shock would be re-
solved by the flexibility of wages. According to him, the decrease in pay
claims in region A increases the supply and strengthens the competitiveness
of that region, while the rise of these same claims causes the inverse effect in
region B. The shock will then be cushioned without the need to modify the
exchange rate.5
In MC, although there are no linguistic, cultural and geographical obsta-
cles to mobility, the emigration towards the North of the Mediterranean is
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5 Mundell opts for an adjustment through factor’s mobility, because he considers that
prices and wages are rigid (at least in a fall).
more important than towards the South. In fact, the mobility of intraregional
labour remains low, for political and socioeconomic reasons.
Since 1995, the ground borders between Morocco and Algeria have been
closed and the unemployment rate and poverty of MC remains high.
Moreover, these markets are constrained by rigid rules and legislations
contributing to a low flexibility in labour markets, to unemployment and the
rise of the informal market (Dyer 2005).
Financial integration: Many economists (essentially Ingram 1962-1973)
consider that financial integration is the pertinent criterion of an OCA.6
In any zone, an accelerated financial integration of markets is synonym of
growing depth and liquidity that strengthen the capacity of that zone to ab-
sorb asymmetric shocks, without turning to the exchange rate instrument.
In fact, every payment imbalance between the regions of the zone is com-
pensated by a flow of capital going from the countries with excess capital to
countries with a capital deficit, which supposes the absence of any limitation
in capital mobility and the liberalisation of financial services’ supply.
Besides, perfect capital mobility eliminates the interest rates’ differential
and by the same way the exchange rates. This, in turn, makes the diversifica-
tion of financial portfolios easier and can act as a shock absorber.
In MC, although a financial liberalisation process has started, integration
in international financial markets remains low. The indicator of financial
openness (K open) is always negative for all MC and shows to what extent
they keep controlling their capital account towards the rest of the world and
in particular, towards other Maghreb partners (Table 1).
Table 1. K open for MC (1999-2004)
Source: Chinn and Ito (2006)
Moreover, this weakness may be due to the fragility of the banking sector
(high proportion of non performing loans, great country and credit risk) as
well as different standards in banking rule and supervision.
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6 The works by Ingram are not centered on the problem of OCA per se, but on the instabili-
ty and the equilibrium of the balance of payments.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tunisia -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825
Morocco -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825
Algeria -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825 -1.094825
Openness of economy
For Mac Kinnon (1963), the choice between fixed versus flexible exchange
rates (or between monetary union versus autonomy) should be made ac-
cording to the intensity of trade relations.
He considers that in an open economy, where the ratio of tradable/non
tradable goods is high, the exchange variation strongly affects this ratio and
causes instability. His argumentation holds on the fact that any exchange de-
preciation (or appreciation) would have a major effect on the local/external
demand ratio in a fairly open economy. This is translated by a bad allocation
of resources. In fact, economic agents in an open country integrate foreign
products in the indexation of prices and wages, so that any variation in for-
eign prices resulting from a modification of exchange rate has repercussions
on the level of domestic prices.
Moreover, in an open economy, any depreciation (or appreciation) of ex-
change reveals an increase (or a decrease) in import prices, which will have a
negative repercussion on the stability of prices and will cancel the positive
effects expected from this devaluation (or revaluation).
In 2006, the degree of openness7 remained low in Morocco and to a lesser
extent in Algeria, being respectively 65.4% and 83.1%, whereas in Tunisia it
reached 98% (Table 2).
Table 2. Degree of openness in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 1999-2006 (In %)
* Source: IMF, authors’ calculation
** Source: DataStream.
On the other hand, this degree is proved to be higher in some countries of
CFA franc zone, namely Ivory Coast from the West African Monetary Union
(WAMU) as well as Chad and Congo from the Central African Monetary
Union (CAMU) (Table 3).
Nevertheless, all MC have started liberalising and opening their
economies. Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria signed an association agreement
with the European Union (EU) in 1995, 1996 and 2002. Morocco also signed
an agreement with the United States in March 2004.
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7 Degree of openness = (Exports + Imports) / GDP.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Algeria* 51 63.2 58.5 61.2 63.4 67.7 74.8 83.1
Morocco** 53.3 56.3 55.7 57.7 56.5 60.1 66.2 65.4
Tunisia** 87.3 92.7 100 95.1 91.5 96.5 98.6 98
However, although the Agadir statement signed on 8 May 2001, aimed at
the intensification of bilateral trade between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and
Jordan by creating a free trade zone between Arab Mediterranean Countries,
Maghreb intraregional trade remained low in comparison with the other big
economic blocks (Graph 1).
Graph 1. Intraregional trade (in percentage)
Source: World Bank, 2006
Diversification of production
For Kenen (1969), diversified economies can adopt a fixed exchange rate.
He considers that the consequences of a product demand shock on produc-
tion and employment in a country are smaller when it is a matter of diversi-
fied production, rather than a monoproduction.
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Table 3. Degree of openness in a sample of CFA countries zone (in %)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Benin 42.77 33.41 32.59 36.87 43.72 45.62 33.38
Ivory Coast 63 62.47 59.28 66.12 63.26 68.91 70.71
Burkina Faso 15.11 18.15 14.05 14.61 17.03 22.58 22.49
Cameroon 17.31 18.85 19.55 19.14 21.37 23.28 22.65
Chad 26.01 23.28 36.62 71.31 46.91 76.07 95.9
Congo 79.85 98.97 93.49 94.73 112.1 139.49 172.82
Source: DataStream, authors’ calculations
Indeed, in a country where production is diversified, if there is a decline
in demand for an exported product, the resulting unemployment will be less
important than in the case of a less diversified economy. Thus, this economy
will not have to undergo modifications in its exchange terms and in its rela-
tive prices, through an action on the exchange rate, as often as a monopro-
ducing economy.
In Algeria for example, economic growth and exports depend heavily on
the hydrocarbon sector. Indeed, the energy sector exports represent 98.31%
of total exports, which allows us to conclude that the production structure of
this country is not diversified (Table 4).
Table 4. Algerian exports and imports (2005)
Source: Bank of Algeria (2005)
However, the Moroccan economy is characterised by an important
weight of agriculture on GDP and employment. Its exports depend notably
on foodstuffs, semi-finished products and consumer goods (Table 5).
Table 5. Moroccan exports and imports (2005)
Source: BAM (2005)
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Imports (in % of total imports) Exports (in % of total exports)
Food 17.80% 0.15%
Energy 0.99% 98.31%
Raw materials 3.65% 0.29%
Half-finished products 19.84% 1.13%
Agricultural equipment 0.79% –
Industrial equipment 41.73% 0.08%
Consumer goods 15.20% 0.04%
Imports (in % of total imports) Exports (in % of total exports)
Foodstuffs, drinks and tobacco 8.59% 19.79%
Energy products and lubricants 21.78% 2.45%
Raw products 6.30% 11.07%
Half-finished products 22.23% 27.84%
Equipment products 20.40% 6.46%
Consumer goods 20.66% 32.39%
Finally, for Tunisia, consumer goods in 2003 represented more than half
its exports and 33% of its imports. Raw materials and half-finished products
represented respectively 27.84% and 22.23% (Table 6).
Table 6. Tunisian exports and imports (2005)
Source: Central Bank of Tunisia (2005)
In conclusion, it can be said that the problem of specialisation of the econ-
omy arises essentially in Algeria and to a lesser extent, in Tunisia.
Budgetary integration
Johnson (1970) considers that the existence of an integrated fiscal system
(or a centralised budget) in a zone, allows the latter to give up the instru-
ment of exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism in the case of an asym-
metric shock.
Indeed, when demand moves from one country to another, the existence
of a centralised federal budget helps to reduce the shock through the fall of
taxes in the country suffering from this shock, and the rise of fiscal returns in
the other country.
The total net result would be the existence of an automatic redistributive
effect of the central budget in favour of countries (or regions) in decline.
Such a result is synonymous of a co-insurance between the countries in the
zone.
The criterion of fiscal integration implies the emergence of tax systems
and central transfers, allowing a fall in the absorption cost of shocks; it also
implies the existence of a federal government in the definition of an OCA.
However, if budgets aren’t centralised, transfer is not automatic and the
reduction of the shock may be obtained via borrowing, which supposes a fi-
nancial integration.
For MC, this budgetary integration does not exist. In fact, constraints of
resources and political tensions make fiscal transfers less likely.
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Imports (in % of total imports) Exports (in % of total exports)
Farm-produce industry 6.37% 5.47%
Energy 10.37% 9.98%
Raw materials and
Half-finished products 29.10% 24.37%
Equipment products 20.41% 8.29%
Consumer goods 33.75% 51.87%
Homogeneity of preferences
Haberler (1970), Fleming (1971) and Magnifico (1974) distanced them-
selves from the previous analysis by proposing macroeconomic criteria that
depend on desired policy tradeoffs rather then the state of the economy.
These authors demonstrate that, if the difference in inflation rate between
two countries is nil, the latter constitutes an OCA. The inflation rate is con-
sidered as an indicator that synthesizes a difference in the competitiveness of
productive structures, in pay claim behaviours and in monetary policy ori-
entations (Barthe 2003).
Countries belonging to the same monetary zone have to give up the
seigneuriage and follow a common monetary policy (Machlup 1977).
It then becomes evident that if countries of the same zone present diver-
gent preferences in inflation, the fixed exchange rate between them will be
unsustainable and the countries won’t constitute an OCA.
Such hypothesis implies homogeneity in productive and institutional
structures but also a convergence of monetary policy.
In Maghreb, the inflation rate in 2006 was relatively low in Morocco and
Tunisia. It was respectively 2.5% and 3%, while in Algeria it reached 6%
(Table 7).
Table 7. Inflation rates in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 1999-2006 (In %)
Source: IMF (2005, 2006)
However, despite these encouraging results, the submission of monetary
policies to a fiscal dominance, in view of the big budget deficits in some
countries, strengthens the pressures on monetary policy and makes the de-
sired convergence of budgetary policies, less likely.
1.2. The new approaches of OCA
These approaches were led during the 80’s with the development of the
works of the «new classic school», which considers the monetary policy less
efficient in influencing real variables and focuses essentially on credibility
gains.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Algeria 2.6 0.3 4.2 1.4 2.6 3.6 2.7 6
Morocco 0.7 1.9 0.6 2.8 1.2 1.5 1 2.5
Tunisia 2.7 3.0 1.9 2.8 2.8 3.6 2 3
Moreover, in the early’ 90s, Frankel and Rose started a debate on the en-
dogeneity of the monetary integration process, in contrast with the Krug-
man’s «specialisation school».
OCA and credibility gains
The new concept of OCA consists in introducing the rationality of agents’
expectations.8 It considers that in the case of rational expectations of eco-
nomic policies by private agents, the efficiency of monetary policy depends
heavily on the credibility of monetary authorities (Tavlas 1993).
The basic idea is that there is not a permanent trade-off between inflation
and unemployment and that the delegation of monetary policy (or the sub-
mission of public decisions to an external binding commitment, such as an
exchange rate fixing), allows authorities to benefit from a better reputation in
the eyes of the agents. In fact, this delegation makes for a reduction in infla-
tion without a significant loss of employment.
Thus, by depriving the authorities of the intervention instrument (the re-
vision of monetary policy after the agents’ expectations) we can reach the
optimal solution. This is implemented essentially by a delegation of mone-
tary policy to an independent authority (internal solution) or by a monetary
unification, which « ties the hands » of the authorities (external solution).
The final result is that the country with high inflation level immediately mo-
nopolizes the benefits of a low inflation reputation, without any loss in em-
ployment and production (verticality of Phillips’ curve).9
As for MC, they did not develop monetary and fiscal institutions allowing
them to follow credible rules (central bank independence, for example). The
monetary policy in these countries is considered therefore, as a tool of macro-
economic stabilisation, an instrument to support fiscal policies through the fi-
nancing of budgetary deficits but also, in certain cases, an instrument to drive
industrial policies (Boughzala et al 2007).
Furthermore, the absence of a strong currency in the North African space
limits the credibility of the integration process in these countries.
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8 This concept was essentially developed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), Giavazzi and Gio-
vannini (1989) as part of their works on the European Monetary System (EMS).
9 However, according to Robson (1987), the transition to monetary integration implies
short-term adjustment costs (in terms of an increase in unemployment). The extent of these
costs may be determined by a number of factors including the speed with which the expecta-
tions adjust current inflation, the shape of the short term Phillips curve, the initial divergence
between the inflation rate adopted by the union and the target rate that every member wants to
choose.
The endogeneity of OCA
This approach considers the process of monetary integration as endoge-
nous and doesn’t require prerequisites. The underlying idea is that genuine
integration between countries strengthens the degree of shock symmetry
and thus, the interest to adopt a single currency.
The monetary integration process will create ex-post the conditions of its
success.
This position, defended by Frankel and Rose, opposes Krugman’s spe-
cialisation approach, which estimates that integration will liberate specialisa-
tion forces and will indirectly lead to asymmetric shocks.
Frankel and Rose (1998) indirectly raise the question of the endogeneity
of OCA criteria. They consider a regression as follows:
Corri,j = α + βTradei,j + εi,j (1)
Where Corri,j is the degree of correlation of economic activity between coun-
tries i and j over period t; Tradei,j is the measure of bilateral trade intensity
over period t and εi,j are factors other than trade which influence the correla-
tion degree.
Frankel and Rose’s sample is made up of 21 industrial countries over the
1959-1993 period.
For these two authors, the size of coefficient β shows to which extent
trade is a source of synchronisation or desynchronisation of business cycles.
Indeed, a negative value of β reveals an interbranch trade and shows that
sectoral shocks have asymmetric effects on the economic activity of the
country. In the other hand (β>0), trade is intrabranch and sectoral chocks
have symmetric effects.
The estimation of equation (1) by OLS may be out of place, since the com-
mercial intensity may be the result of monetary union. To handle the prob-
lem of endogeneity, these authors use the instrumental variable technique by
drawing from the gravitational models of trade. Their results suggest that
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is viable ex-post.
For MC, the correlation of real bilateral GDP is measured over the period
1980-2003. In this work, we privileged a slippery correlation by step of six
years, contrary to Frankel and Rose’s works, which use a static correlation
(see appendix I).
Also, the measures of commercial intensity are constructed by reporting
bilateral trade to the total trade of two countries.10 Slippery averages are also
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10 Tradei,j = (Xij + Mij)/(Xi + Xj + Mi + Mj).
calculated by step of six years over the same period (see appendix II). The
data are extracted from the «Direction of Trade Statistics of IMF».
The results of our estimation in Panel dimension are as follows (Table 8):
Table 8. Estimation of Frankel and Rose’s relation for MC (1980-2003)
The endogeneity show so that the OCA criteria aren’t determining pre-
requisites for countries choosing monetary unification. These criteria are en-
dogenous and depend on adopted monetary regimes, in the sense that mon-
etary unification creates the conditions for its success ex-post.11
Moreover, some economists admit that, instead of turning to the theory
(which they consider as static and a-historic) to specify if the monetary area
is optimal or not, it is necessary to examine the different monetary integra-
tion experiences to identify the factors of success and the causes of failure of
these unions (Goodhart 1995, Bordo and Jonung 1999, Sharp 2005).
In this case, the study of history turns out to be useful not only for coun-
tries that do not satisfy the criteria of OCA theory but also for countries that
want to follow the course towards monetary integration.12
What are the lessons that sould be learnt from history?
2. LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF MONETARY UNIONS:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MAGHREB?
The history of monetary unions is easier to understand if we distinguish-
ing the national monetary unions created within the same state, from multi-
national ones created between independent states (Bordo and Jonung 1999,
Rose 2000).
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11 However, in their future research, authors should take into account also a different point
of view that weaken Frankel and Rose approach. For example, Silvestre and Mendonca (2007)
analyse the bilateral relationships between the Portuguese economy and the other European
Union countries and find that the endogeneity is confirmed in just four cases: Spain, Ireland,
Netherlands, and UK.
12 Several works carried out on a sample of countries that, in general, belong to regional
blocks but don’t constitute an OCA.
constant -0.20   (-2.51)
β 0.41   (1.69)*
R2 0.026
In a national monetary union, monetary sovereignty coincides with polit-
ical sovereignty. The borders of «Nation State» are also the frontiers of the
monetary zone. This zone has a unique monetary authority, in general the
central bank.
The examples of the United States, Italy and Germany are often quoted in
this context.
On the contrary, in a multinational monetary union, monetary sovereign-
ty does not coincide with political sovereignty. The countries of this zone can
use a common currency or, in an extreme case, the same money.
In this type of union, the existence of a common monetary authority is
not always insured.
The case of Latin and Scandinavian monetary union as well as the EMU
and the CFA franc zone are illustrative examples.13
The study of these two kinds of unions enables us to draw some lessons
that sometimes appear as necessary conditions – other than those supported
by the OCA theory – for countries wanting the stability and durability of the
monetary unification process.
MC can gain some precepts from historical experience in order to be able
to adopt a permanent monetary organisation allowing them long-standing
credibility and stability.
Many lessons can in fact be drawn from history.
The centralisation of monetary power
A lasting monetary union suggests the existence of a sole monetary au-
thority, which controls the monetary policy for the whole union and possess-
es enough power to correctly enforce the commitment to member countries.
That does not mean inevitably a complete disappearance of national central
banks (in the case of a multinational monetary union) but a redefinition of
their sovereignty borders.
The examples of United States and Germany (in the case of national mone-
tary unions) as well as those of Latin14 and Scandinavian monetary unions (in
the case of international monetary unions) shows up to what extent a centrali-
sation of monetary power is essential for the survival of the monetary union.
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13 Other monetary unions, seldom included in the literature can be also invoked, such as
the «rand zone» (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), the monetary union between
Belgium and Luxemboug, the monetary union between Liberia and the United States, the mon-
etary union between Panama and the United States, etc. A Survey can be found in Bordo and Jo-
nung (1999) and Graboyes (1990).
14 This union groups France, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy together.
In the United States, the centralisation of monetary power was absent until
1914. In fact, the Civil War (1861-1865) divided the political union in two
blocks. In the North block, the greenbacks issued by United States’ treasury
circulated in considerable discount relative to golden coins. In the South
block, inconvertible confederate notes expressed in dollars circulated (Bordo
2004). The circulation of the different kinds of money continued until the Fed-
eral Reserve was founded in 1914. The latter, maintained hereafter, the posi-
tion of common leader in the issue of notes, which were exchangeable be-
tween districts at a set rate. This position was strengthened in 1935, at the time
of the «Banking Act».
Likewise, as part of the German 19th century experience, the causes of
durability of Zollverein15 before the political unification proved to be the size
and the power of Prussia, which was able to apply a certain conformity to
the customs union’ agreement and a promulgation of coherent metallic stan-
dards to small states. Indeed, two monies associated to the big States pre-
vailed at the time: the «Prussian thaler» circulating in the northern German
States and the «gulden» circulating in Bavaria and in other southern States
(Hamada and Porteous 1992). Every member State had to accept the «Vere-
insmünze» (the currency of Zollverein), which costed 2 thalers and 3.5
guldens and was issued in proportion to the population.
Afterwards, the thaler became the main currency of exchange between
the two big parts of Germany. In 1870, the northern German federation pro-
hibited a new issuance of paper money and fixed the volume of bank note is-
suance, thus delegating the supervision of the circulation of this paper mon-
ey to the Prussian bank.
In 1876, the Prussian bank became the «Reichsbank» with a higher leg-
islative power. The other banks kept their right of issuance but were gradu-
ally confined until 1935, when their privilege was abolished.
Similarly, in the 20th century German experience, the maintenance of a
sound monetary policy, managed by the central bank of West Germany after
a political unification with the East (in addition to an important fiscal trans-
fer), was able to insure a certain price stability in the whole union. In fact,
the unification treaty of July 1990 stipulates that a common monetary policy
managed by the Bundesbank is imposed and a conversion system of two
thirds of Ostmarks (OM) in Deutschemark (DM) is supplied.
On the contrary, the decentralised structure of the monetary power in the
C. BANGAKE, A. BELHADJ, N. JEDLANE - TOWARD MAGHREB MONETARY UNIFICATION
15
15 The agreement of the customs union was established between 18 German states putting
an end to their internal barriers.
Latin monetary union brought about the end of this union as well as the
monetary turmoil of the 1870s and the First World War.
Indeed, during this union,16 the countries preserved their monetary is-
suance rights and each central bank had the right to pursuit purely national
objectives. This structure provoked the abandoning of the bimetallic system
on which the union was based.
Also, the First World War created an enormous financing need and
pushed the countries to introduce a paper standard and to depreciate their
currencies. A big issuance of subsidiary coins was noticed, which led to an
increasing depreciation of their values. The result was a progressive refusal
of these coins in each country, as well as an overvaluation of silver coins in
the whole union. The union stopped working when the First World War was
declared, and was formally dissolved with the defection of Belgium in 1925.
Similarly, in the Scandinavian monetary union, which groups together
Sweden, Denmark and Norway,17 the decentralised structure of money sup-
ply and the possibility offered to the member countries to leave the union
have facilitated the conduct of national objectives as well as the dissolution
of that zone at the time of the First World War.
Indeed, the beginning of the war was accompanied by the abolition of
golden note convertibility, for fear of massive withdrawals of metal coins
which would result in losses of gold reserve. At the same time, gold exports
were prohibited in order to prevent its escape. It entailed a disconnection be-
tween the money supply and the supply of gold.
However, money supply strongly increased in Sweden, whose exports
were booming. This rapidly led to the depreciation of the Norwegian and
Danish krone, compared to the Swedish krone (Talia 2004).
Confirming Gresham’s law, Danish and Norwegian notes were exported
to circulate in place of Swedish notes. This situation led to the 1917 ban on
Swedish gold exports and the dissolution of the Scandinavian monetary
union.
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16 The functioning mechanism of this union consists in the fact that member countries can
issue an unlimited quantity of gold and silver coins that have a legal tender in the whole union.
Moreover, each country can issue a limited quantity of a small subsidiary silver coins (whose
face value is higher than the metallic value) that have a legal tender solely in the issuing coun-
try. Subsidiary coins have a lower content in terms of silver than union coins. Each country also
has to accept up to 100 francs of subsidiary coins from other countries, in individual transac-
tions.
17 In this union, the Krone, a common money based on gold, replaced the old Swedish unit
of account «the riksdaler» which had a legal tender in the member countries. The value of this
new money was specified in terms of gold and was the same in all three countries.
Furthermore, in 1924, a supplementary agreement forbidding an equal
circulation of the subsidiary coins, limiting an excessive inflow of this type
of coins in Sweden, put an effective end to this union.
For MC, it is difficult at the moment to give up a part of their monetary
sovereignty to the benefit of a supranational monetary authority. In fact, in
these countries, the monetary policy is influenced by the need of
seigneuriage revenues in order to finance the government public spending.
The independence of the central bank and the impossibility to advance mon-
ey to the public sector, are difficult measures to apply in Maghreb.
The importance of political involvement
The above-mentioned monetary power centralisation does not always
guarantee the viability of a monetary zone. It is notably the case of Russia,
the former USSR countries and Czechoslovakia, where the end of political
unity and centralisation of control led to the disintegration and division of
their monetary unions. Each of them was characterised by a new national
currency and a unique central bank (Goodhart 1995).
The existence of a durable political involvement toward the monetary in-
tegration is the most important instrument supporting the monetary union.
This involvement can be seen at national level, through the presence of a do-
mestic sovereign power imposing the same currency on the entire zone18 or
at an international level, through the existence of a cartel where the members
have to stop pursuing their individual interests to achieve the common ob-
jectives of this cartel. The feeling of national membership – often character-
ized by a symbolic perception, linking money to sovereignty and the willing-
ness to draw seigneuriage benefits – must give in to community member-
ship feeling. Here reigns a common goodwill to standardize coins and notes
in circulation (by adopting a common currency) but also a preference to-
wards the sharing of gains of monetary cooperation.19
The examples of the United States and Germany (as part of intra-state
monetary unions) as well as the franc zone and the Euro zone (as part of in-
ter-state monetary unions) are symbolic of this thesis.
In fact, in the case of Germany, the monetary union has directly followed
the political union. The German monetary system was unified only after the
political unification of 1871, under Bismarck’s leadership. The mark became
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18 We often consider political unification since, within the same State, political borders coin-
cide with the frontiers of monetary union.
19 The definition of budgetary and fiscal rules is also considered as a form of political in-
volvement and is treated in the following paragraph.
the new monetary unit while the minting of golden coins was regulated. The
value of the mark was defined according to the used golden coins, which
were gradually removed from circulation.
The same case appeared in the United States, where colonies used a mix-
ture of coins and paper money before the signature of the Constitution in
1789. This constitution was meant to avoid excessive inflation and the vari-
ability of exchange rates; in particular, it was meant to avoid a seigneuriage
problem inherent to the systems of fixed exchange rates,20 giving the Ameri-
can Congress the unique power of monetary creation and currency value
regulation (Smith and Rolnick 1993). Hereafter, colonies were no longer free
to issue their own currencies.
Furthermore, in the case of the franc zone21 (a multinational monetary
union), the political willingness of the member countries led to a conserva-
tion of this zone. Indeed, after their independence most of the States com-
posing this zone have kept their former anchoring in the French franc and
have stayed in a homogeneous group, whose institutional frame was re-
newed and was structured by a system of common exchange. The agree-
ments signed between 1959 and 1962 by countries belonging to this zone, de-
fined principles governing the monetary organization.22
On the other hand, the important influence of France in the conduct of
the monetary policy of this zone – notably through the unlimited convertibil-
ity of the CFA franc to French franc, the obligation of France to insure all the
internal and external payments in currencies, as well as the representation of
the latter in the organs’ decision of the two African central banks (BCEAO
and BEAC) – insured the success of this zone.
Furthermore, with the advent of the Euro, the functioning mechanisms of
this franc zone were not affected and member countries continued to benefit
from the French financial and budgetary support.23
Likewise, the establishment of the EMU reflected a strong political will to
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20 This problem comes from the fact that, even in the case of fixed exchange rate, where cur-
rencies are perfectly substitutable, a colony can tax its neighbours by an excessive issue of the
currency.
21 This zone includes the West African Monetary Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinee-Bissau in 1997) as well as the Central African Monetary
Union (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Tchad and Equatorial Guinea in
1985).
22 These agreements were modified in the early’ 70s to favour an extension of the interven-
tion domain of the two African central banks.
23 However, a continuous debate on the possibilities of CFA franc unhooking from the Euro
persists. See Pelletier (1999) and Matin (2007) http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200704050407.html.
create the single currency in spite of the existence of some economic objec-
tions. The use of the Euro was indeed the result of a political involvement ac-
cepted by all participating countries (Bordo and Jonung 1999) who, after the
publication of the Delors’ report in 1989, demonstrated their desire to be part
of the union and undertook to monopolize the gains of monetary integra-
tion.
Concerning MC, they do not present the necessary political prerequisites
to form a single currency.24 A political commitment in this direction would
probably constitute a serious problem for the governments, given the tradi-
tional rivalry between some countries of the zone and the importance of the
seigneuriage role as a last resort for these countries. Moreover, political prob-
lems still exist, which have prevented, until now, the completion of the eco-
nomic and financial integration within Maghreb as well as the functioning of
the MAU (Darrat and al 2002).
The importance of fiscal regulation
A centralized monetary union doesn’t necessarily require the centraliza-
tion of fiscal policies, as long as the governments of this union do not often
turn to excessive debts.25
Historical experiments showed indeed, that fiscal policies are often indi-
vidually designed to counter asymmetric shocks (stabilization) or regional
differences (redistribution) once monetary policies lose their autonomies, fa-
cilitating and maintaining political commitment and consequently the mone-
tary unit.
The cases of EMU and some dollarized countries offer attractive exam-
ples.
Indeed, in Europe, the monetary policy is centralized and conducted by
the ECB, while fiscal policies continue to be in the hands of member coun-
tries, following rules defined in the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP).
The same case appears in Panama and Liberia, where the domestic cur-
rency is anchored in the US Dollar. This currency has a legal tender and rep-
resents the major part of money supply. The monetary policies of these coun-
tries were relinquished to the benefit of American monetary authorities,
while fiscal policies remained in the hands of these two countries without
pre-established coordination.
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24 It is the assertion of Rossi (2007) concerning the MENA countries.
25 Moreover, Goodhart (1995) showed that the passage to the euro might be realized with-
out being accompanied by a federalism of governments and fiscal policies.
However, most experiences characterized by a centralization of monetary
policy versus a decentralization of fiscal policies are complemented by re-
gional mechanisms of fiscal transfers allowing them to face idiosyncratic
shocks (it’s the case of the United States).
Moreover, history shows that when monetary policies are decentralized
(absence of a supranational central bank), fiscal policies of the same nature
urge governments to resort to the monetary creation to cover their spending.
This is obviously the case of Italy, as part of the Latin monetary union ex-
perience. In fact, one of the factors that brought about the failure of this
union was the massive resort of Italian authorities to monetary creation. The
budgetary deficit and sovereign debt were not under control and the issue of
subsidiary silver coins created important costs for the other countries of the
union (Bae and Bailey 2003).
However, whether monetary policy is centralized or decentralized, histo-
ry shows that a previous convergence in fiscal behaviour is necessary for the
stability of a monetary union. A strong supervision mechanism of the fiscal
discipline between member countries containing the definition of a series of
budgetary and fiscal convergence criteria, can indeed avoid the problem of
asymmetric shock.
The EMU and the franc zone experiences are significant in this frame.
Indeed, in these two zones, a series of criteria concerning budget deficit
and States’ debts were defined as preliminary criteria to the membership of a
monetary area. It is the stability and growth pact for the EMU and the con-
vergence, stability, growth and solidarity pact for the franc zone.
As regards MC, although some of them underwent significant progress
towards budgetary stability during the last decade (it’s the case of Tunisia
and Morocco),26 a fiscal asymmetry persists requiring a reinforcement of the
central bank independence process. This vulnerability is the result of budget
balance sensitivity to terms of trade imbalances, a dependence on external
flow assistance as well as a wide exposition of these countries to natural dis-
asters, given the importance of the agricultural sector in these countries.
Besides, as it has been clarified, the submission of monetary policies to a
fiscal dominance makes the expecteded budgetary convergence less likely.
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26 The governments of these two countries have indeed moved to more transparent and
more market based debt management instruments. They instituted a system allowing them to
access to financial ressources through negociable and attractive govenment bonds instead of the
previous legal requirements imposed in financial institutions to buy low return government se-
curities (Boughzala and al 2007).
The bipolarity
Intermediate exchange regimes are not compatible with the independ-
ence of monetary and fiscal policies when the financial account is opened.
Indeed, with the opening of capital markets, a country can not maintain both
fixed exchange rates and the autonomy of its monetary policy.27 The choice
of exchange regime in the case of capital movement deregulation must then
be made among either hard pegs or pure floats. The regimes, being in the
middle of these two extremes, are mostly subject to big speculative attacks: it
is the bipolarity concept.
The Panamean monetary system is revealing in this frame. Indeed, it has
been able to insure an economic, monetary and financial stability for many
years although the monetary policy autonomy was absent. This country
adopted a «hard peg» (dollarization) and is characterized by an important fi-
nancial integration where capital flows – notably bank flows – were liberal-
ized, allowing the absorption of monetary and real shocks (Moreno-Villalaz
1999).
Conversely, speculative attacks against some EMS currencies in 1992-1993
showed that monetary unification gets the better of autonomy of national
policies after the abolition of capital mobility control.
The European countries recognized the superiority of a monetary union
for the good working of the single market and abandoned the autonomy of
their monetary policy for the benefit of a supranational central bank; they
defined for that purpose, fixed exchange rates among them but flexible vis-
à-vis the other countries.
At this point, a question concerning the choice of exchange regime for
MC stands out. Given their course towards a full liberalization of their finan-
cial account, have these countries an interest in following the way of mone-
tary unification or should they instead make their exchange rates flexible?
3. THE MONETARY REGIMES FOR MAGHREB
The authorities in Maghreb set as an objective the liberalization of the fi-
nancial account. However, according to the above-mentioned bipolar vision,
the present exchange rate regimes established in these countries are incom-
patible with the integration in international financial markets. In fact, in Al-
geria and Tunisia, the adopted exchange regime is managed float with no
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27 It is the incompatibility triangle of Mundell.
pre-determined path while in Morocco, Mauritania and Libya, the authori-
ties have respectively established a basket peg, a dollar peg and a basket of
IMF special drawing rights (SDR) peg, which in fact belong to the category
of intermediate regimes.
In this sense, MC should opt for one of the «corner solutions», notably for
monetary unification.
As an intermediate stage for this objective, two independent steps could
be possible: either to harmonize the inflation targets in the five countries of
the region, within a framework of pure float,28 or to simultaneously establish
a currency board (Jedlane 2006). These two regimes are compatible with the
liberalization of a financial account, an objective set by the authorities of MC,
and essential to the process of monetary unification.
Within the framework of inflation targets harmonization, the central bank
commits to reach an inflation objective during a certain period and uses ap-
propriate instruments to achieve this aim. Such a policy can succeed in rec-
onciling flexible exchange rates with the establishment of deep regional
links29 (Eichengreen 2002).
For this policy to succeed, some hard conditions should be gathered (Jbili
and Kramarenko 2003):
– Sound budgetary situation and tight coordination of budgetary and mon-
etary policies;
– Well-developed financial system, independence of central bank in the
conduct of monetary policy and price stabilisation mission, relatively
well-known transmission canals between the instruments of monetary
policy and inflation;
– Credibility based on robust antecedents in responsibility and transparency.
It is useful to note that in this framework, the lack of central bank inde-
pendence negatively affects the credibility of monetary authorities. To solve
this problem, many authors have proposed the creation of a regional commit-
tee that takes care of the respect for the monetary rules and inflation targets.
This committee will also take corrective measures when differences appear.
In the case of Maghreb, this solution is not credible because several re-
gional committees were created within the framework of AMU without real-
ly playing their role. These committees remain indeed influenced by govern-
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28 It is the proposal of Eichengreen (2002) to some regional blocks, namely MERCOSUR and
ASEAN.
29 Eichengreen and Taylor (2002) show through a regression, linking the volatility of bilater-
al exchange rate with four OCA’ variables as well as inflation target dummy’variable, that an in-
flation targeting policy produces less instability compared to an exchange rate nominal anchor.
ments, which often show a reluctance to delegate a part of their political
power to a supranational body.
Moreover, in a general way, the floating exchange rate regime in emerg-
ing countries suffers from the “fear of floating”, which negatively affects the
credibility of the central bank. Indeed, an excessive volatility of nominal ex-
change rates can have negative repercussions on investment and growth.
To highlight this phenomenon, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) analyzed the
behaviour of exchange rates, exchange reserves, monetary aggregates and
interest rates. They conclude that the variability of the exchange rate of
countries declaring a free float is slow and this smallness is not due to the
absence of real and monetary shocks but it is the fruit of a voluntary policy
of exchange rate stabilization. This reflects what they call the «fear of float-
ing» and explain why other studies did not succeed in emphasizing a signifi-
cant relation between growth and exchange regime choice.30
The second step consists on a simultaneous institution of currency board
pegged to the Euro.
A currency board is a hard peg regime compatible with the liberalization
of financial account. Under this regime, the full convertibility, an objective
fixed by the authorities of these countries, is insured via a total coverage of
monetary base by exchange reserves. It also imposes a monetary discipline
on the government, because every advance to the treasury is prohibited. The
third advantage is the transparency of the automatic adjustment mechanism,
which avoids the accumulation of imbalances and the repetition of crises.
Thus, due to these three advantages and to the institutionalization of the
fixed exchange rate, the adoption of a currency board permits the reinforce-
ment of the credibility of monetary authorities. This would have positive ef-
fects on trade, foreign direct investment and growth.
In the case of MC, the institution of a currency board would have positive
effects on trade with the European Union, their main commercial partner, as
well as North African intra-trade benefiting from a zone of monetary stability.
Some studies showed that in the absence of explicit monetary cooperation,
the tacit agreement of pegging the Asian currencies to the US Dollar allowed
the increase of intra-regional trade (Lee and Saucier 2005). In this direction,
the currency board would strengthen the convergence of Maghreb
economies. The simultaneous institution of a currency board pegged to the
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30 However, according to Edwards (2002), the optimal policy minimizing the loss function
sometimes imposes a Central Bank intervention on the exchange market. According to this au-
thor, by reacting to real exchange rate (without defending a given level of exchange rate), au-
thorities do not suffer from fear of floating but practice an optimal float.
Euro in MC allows both a nominal and real convergence among these coun-
tries and the EMU. This would allow at the same time, a mutual convergence
within Maghreb and eventually, the creation of a monetary area in this space.
As in Europe, it would be necessary to proceed in a parallel and progres-
sive way: at the same time of the intensification of the economic and finan-
cial integration, it is necessary to lay the bases of a monetary integration. The
institution of a currency board would play in Maghreb the role of EMS pre-
viously played in the European monetary integration process.
However, the adoption of a currency board imposes several conditions.
Firstly, institutional conditions linked to the functioning of the currency
board: these being the constitution of important reserves and the good
choice of the anchor currency. Secondly, structural conditions characterizing
the economy of the country that wishes to adopt a currency board: these be-
ing high competition of companies, flexible labour market, sound public fi-
nances, high degree of openness, healthy, prudent and internationalized
banking system and finally elaboration of an exit strategy.
Concerning Maghreb, institutional conditions do not impose problems. In-
deed, the monetary base in the three countries is covered by more than 100%
of exchange reserves. Moreover, the choice of the anchor currency is clear,
since the European Union is the main commercial partner of MC. The EU is
the unique signatory of free trade agreement with the three countries and the
first investor in the region, rendering the Euro the best anchor currency.31
However, the respect of structural conditions would require that the MC
pursue reforms already begun. In these three countries, it is necessary to im-
prove the economy competitiveness, increase the labour market flexibility
and internationalize the banking system. Algeria and Tunisia have to
strengthen their banking systems, but most of all, Algeria has to restore its
public companies and increase, as well as Morocco, the openness of its econ-
omy. Finally, Morocco and Tunisia should reduce their national debts and
their budget deficits.
CONCLUSION
Basing our analysis on the theoretical and empirical literature of OCA
theory, we showed that MC cannot constitute a monetary block that satisfies
the criteria of optimality. Indeed, these countries suffer from a smallness of
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31 However, in Algeria, the dependance of Algerian exports to energy products invoiced in
Dollar makes the choice of the Euro as an anchor currency less clear.
intra-regional trade, an importance of specific shocks as well as an important
heterogeneity of economic structures making the loss of autonomy of the ex-
change rate instrument expensive.
However, by testing the endogeneity hypothesis from the basic relation of
Frankel and Rose, it has been proved that a convergence cannot be estab-
lished between MC and that it remains insignificant.
Furthermore, by analyzing the history of monetary unions, we found that
the success of a monetary integration process needs to be per se credible, to
establish a centralization of monetary power, to guarantee a strong political
involvement and maintain a fiscal discipline. These historical experiences al-
so allowed us to verify that corner solutions concerning exchange rate
regimes have to accompany the liberalization of a financial account.
The application of these conditions in the case of MC forces them to
strengthen their political coordination and improve their budgetary and fi-
nancial situations.
Finally, with the aim of reaching a Maghreb monetary unification, we ex-
pressed the idea that these countries have to make more efforts to attain the
economico-institutional conditions necessary to set up one of the two pre-
liminary proposed monetary systems, namely a pure float with inflation tar-
geting or a currency board.
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Appendix I.
Slippery correlation by step of six years of the real GDP of MC (1980-2003)
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Années ALG-MAR ALG-MAU ALG-TUN MAR-MAU MAR-TUN MAU-TUN
1981 -0,03813251 -0,03813251 0,30900062 -0,28872515 -0,68394413 -0,09564694
1982 0,32601417 -0,59675217 -0,03749724 -0,17422439 -0,74306715 -0,1392353
1983 -0,23589718 -0,35833277 0,49319736 0,08543262 -0,7390751 -0,49349823
1984 -0,0952415 -0,34713545 0,35883725 0,12281909 -0,67560272 -0,58270867
1985 -0,07635251 0,34717866 0,08601205 0,15746322 -0,62686735 -0,72455237
1986 -0,25931814 0,36538761 -0,11308804 0,12038689 -0,67021942 -0,78650599
1987 -0,36824863 0,46349742 -0,01054478 -0,13007452 -0,71074133 -0,56484103
1988 -0,28983296 -0,20276224 0,21108878 -0,38199849 -0,50602585 -0,53839477
1989 -0,27922531 -0,28285914 0,10509294 -0,20578369 -0,27771066 -0,78911094
1990 -0,67066122 -0,29496663 0,2436374 -0,2855544 0,01263591 -0,81579863
1991 -0,15109292 -0,34534398 0,4683114 -0,26951534 0,20198948 -0,65819879
1992 -0,05053174 -0,57442792 0,45579928 -0,10235704 0,19351034 -0,78400742
1993 0,13758311 -0,59536667 0,50404781 -0,35052074 0,56891682 -0,7195024
1994 -0,08067144 0,16613421 0,27684325 -0,36656653 0,39985065 -0,47192516
1995 0,50250624 0,1940783 -0,07918595 -0,42650956 0,71995459 -0,48831518
1996 0,7513135 0,13541146 0,18402763 -0,23714621 0,3484976 -0,26783729
1997 0,7312045 0,13654548 -0,40462523 0,00473766 -0,27674668 0,36703433
1998 0,5042087 0,1105344 0,05957278 -0,44583651 -0,05213193 0,76666956
Appendix II.
Slippery averages by step of six years of the commercial intensity (1980-2003)
C. BANGAKE, A. BELHADJ, N. JEDLANE - TOWARD MAGHREB MONETARY UNIFICATION
27
Années ALG-MAR ALG-MAU ALG-TUN MAR-MAU MAR-TUN MAU-TUN
1981 4,52274E-05 0,000683688 0,00327643 0,000114877 0,00210214 0
1982 4,52274E-05 0,000747318 0,00444789 9,04792E-05 0,00251892 0
1983 8,38879E-05 0,001214815 0,00516546 8,38125E-05 0,0028938 4,0381E-06
1984 0,000435847 0,001319854 0,00589864 0,000126153 0,00321701 7,3659E-06
1985 0,000814609 0,001392632 0,00692483 0,000124975 0,00354329 6,4601E-05
1986 0,001336431 0,001563073 0,00735621 0,000182699 0,00385114 0,00012112
1987 0,00237112 0,001578995 0,00727434 0,000252069 0,00410427 0,00012824
1988 0,003113782 0,001600687 0,00723888 0,000340193 0,00430867 0,00013845
1989 0,004154669 0,00165498 0,00727409 0,000390227 0,00404558 0,00016562
1990 0,004664025 0,001328034 0,00731908 0,000436725 0,00378789 0,00018437
1991 0,004919167 0,00106007 0,00709639 0,000473042 0,00349676 0,0001929
1992 0,004885038 0,001137428 0,00614612 0,000566363 0,00331807 0,00016543
1993 0,004671441 0,001136019 0,00536126 0,000500823 0,00289566 0,00014831
1994 0,003984739 0,001143139 0,0047389 0,000425098 0,00261259 0,00016884
1995 0,003733348 0,000973019 0,00419914 0,00043307 0,00247174 0,00019123
1996 0,003246514 0,000923537 0,00344479 0,000471841 0,00245097 0,00019191
1997 0,003145142 0,000844735 0,00295848 0,000564313 0,00243278 0,00020614
1998 0,002951127 0,000893876 0,00274619 0,000615833 0,0024986 0,0002429
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